Economics of compatibility standards and competition in telecommunication networks

The pro- and anti-competitive implications of technical compatibility standards are introduced in general terms and then applied to current issues in telecommunications policy. The demand and supply for standards under regulated monopoly and the transition to deregulation and competitive entry create a tradeoff between the traditional goal of achieving positive externalities from interconnection and the alternative goal of providing enhanced service offerings that may involve sacrificing universal connectivity. We argue that this tradeoff has affected the utilization of data communication networks in the U.S. and Europe. In addition, we identify problems of competing interests that complicate the European approach to standards “harmonization” in the case of telecommunications. We conclude by noting that the nature of standards and standard-setting process can have marked effects on the incentives to conduct private research and development.     

Factor-Price Equalization By Trade In Joint and Non-Joint Production

Sans joint products, relative factor prices do determine relative goods prices. Free trade in goods thus can hope to equalize factor returns when this relationship is monotone and therefore uniquely reversible. However, when joint production obtains, often the same relative factor prices can entail an infinity of relative goods prices depending upon the composition of tastes and demand. In consequence, trade's equalization of goods prices is compatible with factor-returns inequality. Generic and singular relationships are described.     

The Viability of Keynesian Demand Management in an Open Economy Context

This paper explains why, in an open economy context, Keynes-type demand management policies appear to have lost their ability to create jobs domestically. Instead stimulatory policies tend to create an import deficit (as jobs are created abroad) and the ear of inflation domestically. The paper then suggests remedies that will resurrect Keynes-demand management policies to stimulate expansion without experiencing balance of payment problems or domestic inflation.     

Life insurance in a contingent claim framework: Pricing and regulatory implications

In this paper we develop a contingent claim model to evaluate the equity and liabilities of a life insurance company. The limited liability of shareholders is explicitly modelled. We focus on a specific type of life insurance policy—namely, the profit-sharing policy. In this policy, the policyholder is entitled to a guaranteed interest rate and a percentage of the company's yearly financial revenues. The implicit equilibrium interest rate and profit-sharing ratio are derived and analyzed. We finally discuss regulatory measures frequently encountered in the life insurance business such as rate ceilings, capital ratios, and asset restrictions.     

Composite commodities, housing characteristics and the Hicksian surplus measures of welfare change

The purpose of this paper is to elaborate on previous research that deals with the implications of alternative housing concepts for the estimation of the welfare effects of housing programs. We compare one housing concept, which defines housing in terms of a composite good housing services with an alternative in which housing is treated as a bundle of attributes. We extend the analysis in the literature by concentrating on welfare measures that are applicable to a much broader class of government programs than those that have been discussed before. We focus in the Hicksian surplus measures which are particularly suited to handle structure in which constraints on quantity are impused. In the theoretical sections we rigorously show that the Hicksian surplus measures of welfare change based on the composite good housing services will be biased whenever a housing program imposes restrictions on the consumption of attributes. The direction of the bias depends on the nature of the program. Empirical work confirms the predictions of the theoretical analysis.     

'Beyond the M-form': Towards a Critical Test of the New Form

This paper critically examines Bartlett and Ghoshal's claim that a radical new organizational form, distinctly different from the M-form both in terms of its structure and psychological underpinnings, may be observed among transnationals. The main theoretical dimensions of the M-form and the 'New Form' are delineated and compared within the context of the discourse between Transaction Costs Economics (TCE) and the Knowledge Based Approach on organizational advantage. Thereafter empirical evidence centred on ABB is extended and re-examined. On the basis of this analysis the thesis of an emergent new form is found to be unsupported. It is thus reasonable to assume that any organizational advantage transnational companies may possess still resides in hierarchical governance as identified by TCE and outlined in its multinational M-form application. To the extent to which it exists, normative social control has a secondary status.     

Uk Corporate Acquisitions In Latin America In The 1990s: Lost Opportunities In A New Economic Environment

During the 1990s, foreign direct investment flowed into Latin America at an unprecedented rate. Capital inflows associated with privatizations and private mergers and acquisitions (M&As) rose steeply. Drawing on original firm–level transactions data, this article examines the extent to which UK enterprises participated in the Latin American privatization and private M&A boom. The authors conclude that, relative to their counterparts in many other major industrial countries, UK enterprises adopted a cautious stance, largely eschewing privatization opportunities and concentrating M&A activities on relatively few operations, sectors and countries, in order to strengthen product and market positions. Moreover, the strategic logic guiding the most important corporate acquisitions centred on gaining access to domestic markets rather than attempting to create global export platforms.     

Union membership and campaign contributions

Summary and Conclusions Laws governing labor relations in the United States are written in a manner which gives significant monopoly power to unions and also creates an incentive for workers to support union security arrangements. These laws would serve to reduce the gains which workers receive from unionization. They would also serve to increase the surplus which unions extract from their members. The argument that an important part of these laws is the creation of rents which can be transferred to the politicians who support laws. An examination of the effect of right-to-work laws on political contribution received by candidates for office indicates that, as the theory would predict, the existence of such laws serves to significantly reduce the contributions from unions. This reduction occurs largely because these laws reduce the number of union members who contribute; they do not seem to change the contributions per union member. The authors hypothesize that it is the monopolization which increases per member contributions, though testing this hypothesis is not possible. Nonetheless, it is the authors' belief that the empirical results have demonstrated the form of the laws mandating unions is explained by the interaction between the union and the politicians who support unionization.